Supreme Court Ruling on
Chapter 2 Aid to Parochial Schools
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement "secular, neutral, and nonideological" programs.
Does Chapter 2 Aid Violate the Establishment Clause?
Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (2000)
- In a 6-3 vote, the United States Supreme Court held that Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 does not violate the Establishment Clause. Using Chapter 2 funds, a Louisiana public school district furnished local private schools, a majority of which are parochial, with computers, computer software and library books. Plaintiffs sued on the grounds that this diversion of federal funds to parochial schools violates the Establishment Clause, which forbids the government from making any law respecting the establishment of religion.
- Using Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) as it’s guide, the Court determined that the parochial school’s Chapter 2 program did not have the effect of advancing religion. First, the Court determined that the program has a secular purpose. The aid allocated in the form of computers, software and books is accomplished on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favors nor disfavors religion. Furthermore, Chapter 2 aid is available to students in both secular and religious settings. Second, Chapter 2 does not have as it’s primary effect either the advancement or inhibition of religion. The Court argued that the program does not amount to a form of governmental religious indoctrination; aid is allocated without regard to religious purpose or affiliation.
- Furthermore, the school a child attends, whether public, private, or parochial is the result of parental, not governmental, decision making--aid follows the child regardless of where he or she attends. Finally, the Court argued that there was no evidence that the aid provided has an impermissible purpose. The aid has no inherent religious significance and even though evidence existed that some aid was being diverted to sectarian uses, the Court determined that it was inconsequential.
- The dissent criticizes the plurality for effectively eliminating the “effects test” by promoting a single “evenhandedness neutrality” test. Taking issue with the majority’s presumption that aid applied equally without regard to religion results in “secular and equal effects”, the dissent argues that defining a government program as “secular” doesn’t insure that the aid provided will be used for secular purposes. It also criticizes the majority’s disregard of the distinction between per capita aid and individual aid by contending that the distribution of Chapter 2 aid does not involve awarding aid to an individual making an independent private choice.
Impact on Missouri
Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution prohibits use of public funds to aid, directly or indirectly, any church or religious denomination or any church-based school. For this reason, programs in Missouri providing materials to private and parochial schools have been held to be in violation of this stricter state standard on separation of church and state.